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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
t 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. : Case No. 870350CA 
vs. 





Defendant was convicted of second degree felony 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in 
Fifth District Court* This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMSNT^QF^THE.ISSUf 
Whether the officer's stop of defendant was a pretext 
for an investigative search where the officer observed defendant 
travelling unlawfully at 56 miles per hour in the left-hand lane 
of traffic and failing to yield to approaching traffic and where 
the officer had no reason to suspect defendant was involved in 
any other unlawful activity prior to the stop. 
The State charged defendant with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distributer in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (1986). After a preliminary hearing, 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence in Fifth District Court 
before Judge J. Philip Eves* Judge Eves denied the motion and 
defendant subsequently pleaded no contest on July 20, 1987. 
Judge Eves sentenced defendant on July 20, 1987 to an 
indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
The State agrees with defendant's statement of the 
facts with the following additions: 
After Trooper Smith stopped defendant and ascertained 
that he had no driver's license but before any search of the car, 
Trooper Smith issued a traffic citation for driving without a 
license and a warning for the left lane violation (P.T. 14).* 
This occurred after defendant gave his name as Sigfredo Eduardo 
Sherra, birthdate April 4, 1961, and explained that he lost his 
wallet containing his New York driver's license the previous day 
(P.T. 9,12). There was no one licensed to drive in New York with 
that name (P.T. 14). 
The vehicle defendant drove was registered to 
defendant's friend in New York (P.T. 12-13). The interior of the 
car was very clean and contained no luggage or clothing except 
for a jacket and a map or road atlas (P.T. 9,13). Smith 
requested back-up based upon these observations and because 
defendant had no identification (P.T. 13). 
After Trooper Smith gave defendant the citations, 
defendant insisted he had a driver's license (P.T. 15). A short 
conversation occurred and Smith asked defendant if he was 
1
 All references to "P.T." are to the Preliminary Hearing 
transcript dated April 8, 1987. 
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carrying narcotics or weapons or anything illegal (P.T. 16)• 
Defendant said no and offered to let Smith look in the trunk, 
then retrieved the car keys and opened the trunk lid for Smith 
(P.T. 16). 
After looking through the trunk. Officer Smith looked 
inside the passenger compartment and found defendant's lost 
wallet on the floor between the front passenger seat and the door 
(P.T, 17). Inside was defendant's resident alien card with the 
name Sigfredo Eduardo Sierra Parra with the birthdate as April 
10, 1961 and a New York driver's license (P.T. 17). 
Smith also looked underneath the car and discovered 
signs that the gas tank had been recently removed (P.T. 18-20). 
The tank sounded as if it contained only a few gallons of gas 
when tapped but the gauge registered over full (P.T. 20). It 
also hung down from the car further than normal (P.T. 21). 
Smith arrested defendant for providing false 
information about his name and birthday (P.T. 21). Smith and 
another officer took defendant's car to Cedar City, obtained a 
search warrant and dropped the gas tank (P.T. 21-22) . Above the 
tank was a trap door containing 15 packages weighing about 2\ 
pounds each (P.T. 23). Inside the packages was 31.3 pounds of 
96% pure cocaine (P.T. 29). 
Trooper Smith lawfully stopped defendant for a routine 
traffic violation and issued a warning and a citation to 
defendant prior to searching defendant's car. Smith only 
searched the car after he developed a reasonable suspicion that 
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defendant was involved in drug trafficking and after defendant 
volunteered to let Smith search. The facts do not establish that 
Smith only stopped defendant on the traffic violation as a 
pretext to search for drugs since Smith had no basis to suspect 
defendant of narcotics trafficking until after he stopped 
defendant. 
ABSUMEUT 
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT FOR AN OBSERVED TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION WAS NOT PRETEXTUAL 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence below and 
claims on appeal that it was error to deny his motion because the 
stop for a traffic violation was pretextual. He claims that the 
Utah Highway Patrol trooper who stopped him did so with an 
improper motive and without reasonable suspicion that defendant 
had committed or was committing a crime. On close consideration, 
these claims fail. 
First/ defendant apparently argues that since he 
believes Trooper Smith had an improper motive for the traffic 
stop, Smith must have had a reasonable suspicion of other 
criminal activity before he could stop defendant for the traffic 
violation he observed. This assumption is not only incorrect but 
is also refuted by defendant's own case law. In Ui*i.t£d_J5Jtfli£.£_vA 
5ffiiJLll# 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986), the court said that an 
improper motive alone will not invalidate an objectively 
reasonable stop, for instance, a stop based upon the probable 
cause of an observed traffic violation, jSflliil)* 799 F.2d at 708-
709. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns 
on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of 
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the f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o n f r o n t i n g him at the t i m e , 1 and 
not on the o f f i c e r s a c t u a l s t a t e of mind a t the time the 
c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n was t a k e n . " 2 Id* a t 709 , quot ing daiylflBfiLi-i. 
ttaZSin, 472 U .S . 463 , 470 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . SS& alSQ SGQ±t-X±Jlnite& 
S£a±&£, 436 U.S . 128 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Uflii£d_Sis:t££_YjL_£2l2iDJS£a r 414 U.S . 
218 (1973) ( o f f i c e r s mot ive i r r e l e v a n t i f s earch made i n c i d e n t 
t o l awfu l a r r e s t ) ; UDii£d-.SifiJ:fifi^XjL-UfillJDail# 541 F.2d 196 (8th 
C i r . 1976) ( o f f i c e r s mot ive i r r e l e v a n t i f s t o p made for probable 
cause of t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n ) . In f a c t , numerous c a s e s have 
s u s t a i n e d s e i z u r e s made a f t e r p o l i c e s topped t r a f f i c v i o l a t o r s 
and s u b s e q u e n t l y observed n a r c o t i c s or other ev idence in t h e i r 
c a r s . £ x g x EUfibY_X*_HlliJ;£d-S£fl±£S r 296 F.2d 328 (9th C i r . 1 9 6 1 ) ; 
Z&Ll&LSQD-XjL-lInitsS-SLtaX&S r 121 U.S . App. D.C. 2 7 9 , 349 F.2d 714 
( 1 9 6 5 ) ; UDii£d-.SJtai££.v^_Bfiuijass5f 411 F.2d 69 (10th C i r . ) , c e r t , 
d e n . , 396 U.S . 915 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; S±£±i£_YjL_££li l l i , 427 F.2d 1296 (6th 
C i r . 1 9 7 0 ) ; Bulifid-SlaJtfiS-^-Dlfil*f 452 F.2d 230 (5th C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) ; 
Ulli££d_£l£±££-X*-H£l)jaDn£ # 461 F.2d 1110 (8th C i r . 1 9 7 2 ) . Where 
the i n i t i a l s t o p was v a l i d , Trooper Smith "had the duty t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e s u s p i c i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t then came t o h i s 
a t t e n t i o n . " UDii£d-5Jtjai£S-i^-.Cj:jJJ2r 5 81 F.2d 535 , 539 (5th C i r . 
1978) and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . The only i s s u e t h a t remains , i s 
whether the s t o p of defendant for a l e f t l a n e v i o l a t i o n was 
o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e . 
1
 Defendant does not s p e c i f y t h a t he appea l s under the Fourth 
Amendment o n l y , however, he c i t e s only f e d e r a l c a s e law in h i s 
p r e t e x t argument and does not c i t e t o the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n a t 
any p o i n t in h i s b r i e f . 
- 5 -
Trooper Smith observed defendant driving in the left 
lane of the freeway when he approached defendant's car from 
behind. While defendant could have moved to the right more than 
once to yield to the officer, he did not do so. The officer 
testified that this was true even though defendant did drive past 
two vehicles travelling in the right hand lane. Defendant did 
not move over to the right until Smith turned on his flashing red 
lights. Utah Code. Ann. S 41-6-53 establishes a duty to drive on 
the right side of the road with certain exceptions that do not 
apply here.3 The trooper's purpose to stop defendant, who was in 
an out-of-state car, and warn him of that statute was proper and 
reasonable. That the trooper had previously checked to see if 
defendant's car was stolen was irrelevant. 
The officer's purpose is further supported by the fact 
that he did issue a warning citation for that offense and another 
citation for driving without a license. Smith did not then 
proceed to arrest defendant or to search defendant's car incident 
to these violations. He only searched the car after defendant 
volunteered to let him search. And only arrested defendant after 
the search revealed that defendant lied to Smith about his name 
and birthdate. 
This case is not like hna&QLzSQnzalSS-}ljL-J2ni££&-.&&al&£t 
391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); TflglaYflI£_£j^ Hflii£d-£ifli£S ' 291 
P.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Hnit£d_S±fl££S_YA_KfiIl£Ir 499 F. Supp. 
3 While defendant argues that the freeway is a one-way road 
falling under S 41-6-53(1)(d), it is clear from the language of 
that section that it does not apply to divided highways such as 
the freeway. 
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415 (N.D. 111. 1980); or UDi:t£^£ifli£S_Yx_MiXiifl* 588 F. Supp. 45 
(W.D.N.Y. 1984). Those cases all represent pretext stops where 
the defendant was improperly detained for the underlying purpose 
of investigation and not for the traffic offense claimed. 
In &ma&QLzQQnz&l£Z# the defendant was stopped for 
traffic offenses committed while narcotics officers were watching 
him for a possible narcotics transfer across the Mexican Border. 
The arresting officer was a narcotics officer who testified that 
the real purpose for making the arrest was to search Defendant's 
car. The Court there noted that traffic arrests are usually made 
immediately upon the commission of the offense (which was not the 
case in £mad£l)* that narcotics officers do not generally arrest 
for traffic offensesf and that the officer did not carry a ticket 
book. While a uniformed officer had issued the traffic 
citations, the defendant was not booked for these offenses. 
In the present case, the trooper had a ticket book, 
made the stop immediately, and, in fact, issued the warning 
citation. It was not until after the stop that the trooper's 
suspicions became aroused that Defendant might be a drug courier 
(based upon facts he observed later). He did not search the 
Defendant's wallet for 31 pounds of cocaine as did the officer, 
looking for a gun, in JSfilifiX. £fill£X is a factually ridiculous 
case, where the officer admitted that he stopped the Defendant, 
hoping to recover evidence of a more serious crime, since "many 
times a traffic violation does lead to bigger things." The 
officer arrested the Defendant and performed a "protective 
search." He testified that he "looked into the wallet to see if 
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the Defendant had a gun concealed there". 499 F. Supp. at 416. 
Clearly that was a pretext arrest and search. 
Defendants reliance on T^3l^^lQLS^2jL^nitS^&taX^S# 291 
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) , is also misplaced. The case does, 
however, with the others, illustrate the kind of case referred to 
by the court as a "sham" or "pretext" arrest. There Defendant 
was under investigation for narcotics. The investigator gave the 
officers an arrest warrant for two minor traffic offenses that 
the investigator had observed the previous evening. At that time 
he told the officers that there was an "excellent chance" that 
Defendant would be in possession of marijuana. The arresting 
officers admitted that it was not usual procedure to arrest a 
person for minor traffic violations. It was clear that the 
arrest warrant was a pretext for a search of the defendant's 
person. 
In contrast, the trooper herein did not have prior 
information on the Defendant, and was not looking to find drugs 
in Defendant's possession (until after the stop). Moreover, the 
trooper made the traffic stop at the time of the violation, not 
on a subsequent date as in X^lSHSLS • 
There is another significant distinction between the 
case at bar and l£3la%£L£. Once arrested, Taglavore took his 
left hand out of his pocket and placed it to his mouth. He then 
turned and made a dash for the doorway. One of the two arresting 
officers pushed him up against a wall and began to choke him. 
The two officers then wrestled him to the floor. While one 
continued to choke him, the other officer sat on his stomach 
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until he opened his mouth and the officers could remove the 
remains of a marijuana cigarette. Nothing of the kind happened 
to Defendant. In fact, Defendant was free to leave after the 
warning ticket and no-driver•s-license citation had been issued. 
It was the Defendant who then i^ lunififilfid to have the trooper 
look into the trunk. There was neither pretext nor force 
involved. 
In Unit£dS£a$,££-XjL-ltelliQ# officers stopped Millio for 
his unpaid parking tickets, arrested him aijid searched his car for 
a pistol the officers suspected he carried there. There, the 
I 
officers entertained the suspicion and theh came up with a reason 
to stop Millio and search his car. Here, while Smith may have 
entertained some suspicions about defendant^ before the stop, he 
did not follow through with a search of defendant's car until 
defendant volunteered to allow a search. 
Factually, this case is more like State,Y.t_ QQhsn* 711 
P.2d 3 (N.M. 1985). There, a traffic stop also escalated into 
something more based upon facts discovered after the stop. The 
New Mexico Supreme Court held that it was not a pretextual stop. 
The stop here was not pretextual but based upon a valid traffic 
violation and merely escalated into something more. 
-9-
CQUQhJI&IQB 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to uphold the lower court's findings and affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
DATED this J ^ L _ day of ^ k^2^3^fcc # 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
i&^f/;: 
5ANDRA L. £$i 
Assistant'-Attorrfey General 
MAlLHJS_££BTIfICAT£ 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1988, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to James L. 
Shumate, 110 North Main, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
^Z^^^tZ 
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